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FOR REL£ p.St..
Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D.

1

Montana)

~~R '> 0 .t:tj

RELEASE for p. m, 's of

REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY - III
THE NORTH AFRICAN CRISIS

Mr. President:
On occasions in recent weeks I have
policy,

add r ess~d

On January 20 , I dealt -- as have other Members of the Senate - - with

the need for a gcn..:ral review of foreign policy,
at

th~;;

the Senate on foreign

My thought, as 1 expressed it

time, was that out of the r..:vicw "there could come new ideas to fill the

vacuum, to stop the dangerous drift which has settled over our foreign policy . 11
A month later, on February 16, I discussed the region of Southeast
A8ia as it relates to American foreign policy,

An

~xamination

of the situation

in that region led me to the following conclusions:
"1. Thli United States should make clear that it
stands solidly behind our present obligations under the
Southeast Asia defense treaty. At the same time, however
w~, should also make ch~a r that we arc always prepared to
consider a reduction in our role in the defense of that area
under certain conditions. The conditions are either a re cession in the totalitarian threat to Southeast Asia or the
strengthening of its defenses by the accession of nations
more directly concerned to th.: treaty or by other defensive
arrangements.

1

2. Th~ Executive Branch should make a careful
r c -o..::xamination of the premises undc:!r which it disp~nses
military aid, It must bring into its calculations more emphatically than H has in the past such factors as genuine
need and capacity of recipient governments in t..:rms of
th .. i r defense and the degree of responsibility which thc;!y
show to thdr own peoples.
11

- 2 "Further, the Execuu ve Branch should repo rt
as fully as possibk to th~ American people on the extent
to which Amarican equ1pment has fallen into the hands of
the communists in Asia. I! it fails to do so in the nca r
future, then the appropriate co;nmittccs of Congress
mighl well considl.!r a complete investigation of this
matter.
"3. Non- military grant aid as a permanent clcmcnt of Am<..rican foreign policy should be limited, as was
intended by Congr~ss, to the Technical Assislanc~:: or the
Point Feu r Program . If the Executive B r anch presents a
pro:Jp~ctus for a useful and effective expansion of this
progral'l' -- and I am not at all sure that this is pes sible
- - then I btdi.eve Congress should give it sympathetic
consideration.
"Large - scale grants of <;conom1c aid to any
country wh0n nec.cs sitatE::d by unusual circums tanccs,
however, should be considered individually o n their
own merits by the Congress .
I

"If the Southeast Asian and other underdeveloped
countries seck long - rang<:. aid for economic developm e nt
unavailable through existing sources such aid should be
considered as far as pes sible for whol e regions and on
the basis of repayable credits of the most generolW
terms . The Executive Branch should preso..:nl spc;..cific
proposals in this connection and not seek a pcrmancnl
blank check which reveals little of the extent to which
this countr y might be committed without the clear under standing of the American people. and the consent of the
Senate and Congress as a whole."
1

I also pointed out the v1tal significance of the Bandung Confcx-ence,
th£> attitude of the overseas Chinese --especially in Singapore, DJakarta, and
elsewhere -- and the altitude of C(;rtain Southeast Asian states toward the
Geneva Conference between the United States and Communist China -- a
confer~ncc

now in

it~

seventh month .
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My intention, as I have already indicated, is to review developments
in various critical regions of the world, from time to time -- North Africa,
Western Europe, the Far East, the Middle East

it is pos sibl<• to pinpoint

half a dozen situations where American policies can profit from examination
by the Senate.

In some of these situations --as in

readily apparent.

I<or~a

--our concern is

In others, this country appears to be only remotely involved

or not involved at all.
Appearances, however, can b<:

d~cephve,

Mr .

seems remote today can become immediate tomorrow.

P r esid~nt.

What

I need hardly remind

the Senate that not so long ago Formosa and Korea wero scarcely more than
geographic place names.

And who among us had ever heard of the so-called

o£f-shore islands of China until we were impelled by them towards war?
The examples could be multiplied, but the: Senate will understand the
point I am trying to make.

Every major situation of international tension --

however remote, however indirect our present concern may be - - every situation
of that kind car ries a potential impact for the safety and welfare of this country .
Our

{or~ign

pohcy must take these situations fully into consideration and the

Senate cannot afford to lose sight of th\!m.

We cannot afford to do so, if we

are to fulfill effectively our constitutional function of advice and consent in
forC!ign relatio ns.
It is for this reason, Mr. President, that I wish to discuss today the

North African crisis.

The difficulties in North Africa have been among the
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more obscure in their imphcations for American foreign pohcy.

On the

surface they have appeared to have little direct rdationsh1p to tht: interests of
this country.
North Africa can bt: regarded, it has been

r~garded,

as an area '' hich

involves only France, Spam, the French, Moslems and othl.!r pcopl ... s who
inhabit Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria .
Af r ican situation.

That is one way of looking at the North

If we arc not involved, if it is soldy a matler affecting

others, then we have no responsibilities and presumably nothing to worry about.
That is an easy way, Mr. President.
the moment.

But it is an easy way only for

It puts off until tomorrow what blurs the seemingly pleasant

portrait of a world of peace and prosperity today.
The troubl;..; with that approach, Mr. President, is that it ignores the
rcpcrcus sions of the c r is1s 1n North Africa which do aff"'ct us directly.

It

ignores the likelihood that an intensification of the crlSis m that arl-a will draw
us deeper and deeper into the situation .

That process h:ts

alr~ady

begun.

The

recent mob violence against th e American consular post in Tunis, the anti American demonstrations, are the first danger signals and we will igno r e
them at our own peril.
The easy way, then, Mr. President, is perhaps not as easy as it
appc::ars to be at first glance.
happens in North Africa is of

Perhaps 1t may be bettur not to assume that what
littl~

significance to the

Unit~d

States.

9refcrablc for the Senate, for the American people, to begin now to
with the facts in North Africa.

It may be
grappl~

- 5 lf we do so we may obtain a more accurate understanding of how the
to tality of our intere sts are related to these facts and how those interests may
b e st be served.

We may s e e that while the North African crisis do cs indeed

involve in the first instance the relationship of the French and North African
Moslems, it also spreads its impact far beyond this core.

It involve s the

future of the North At1anhc Treaty Organization and European union.

It colors

the attitudes of the Moslem nations and of colonial peoples towards all Western
natio ns, including the United SLatus.

It affects the historical friendship between

Franc e and the Unitt;d States which has ils roots in the American revolution.
It can facilitate the penetration of the African continent by the Soviet Union.
lt embraces, in the last analysis, the future of France as one of the great well-

springs of We stern civilization and freedom.
Arc these matter s in which the United States has only a passing interest?
Are they matters which can be sloughed off as of only casual concern to this
country? Some may so regard them .

I cannot shar e that view and I doubt that

many Americans, if apprised of the facts, will shar u it.
Can NATO

dism t ~ g rate;

can the animosity of the Afro-Asian world

b e lurne d against the '.Ve st; can Communist totalitarianism pe netrate Africa;
can the dem o cracy of France be r e duce d to impv te: ncy i.n the face of to talitanan
pressur e s fro m left and r ight -- can all the s e d eve lopments take place without
the m o st serious implications for this country?

Despite the blissful unaware-

m:ss of s ome , these developm e nts do thr e ate n to issue from the North African
crisis.

The seeds o f all o f th e m ar e already germinating in its heat.
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Those who talk of success in foreign policy may be able to cxorc1se
this crisis with a smug platitude or a smile of fatuous optimism.
must indeed be broad, however, if it is to be

str~tchcd

The smile

to cover the situation

in North Africa.
Mr . Presulent, I am no enemy of the smile.

When it is evoked by

what is pl\lasant or humo r ous, it helps t o lighten the burden oi the day.

It may

L:ven have a place in Lhe sober business of conduc t ing this nation's foreign
r elations just as it has in the conduct of

th~

nation ' s political campaigns.

What

it is not, ho wever, what the smile can never be, ia a substitute fo r sound
foreign policies based on a perc.:!ptiv< understanding of the problems which
confront us.

Nor is it a substitute for careful thought as to how tht interests of

Lhe United States may best be safeguarded in de:aling wlth these problems.

That

is true in the North Afr ican crisis no less than in oth..!rs ,
We cannot smile avvay this situation and its implications for us.

We

can only fac"" it and seek to de lineate an intelligent course for this nation to
pursue with r espect to it .

That is why I r aise the qu ... stion o! No r th Africa and

ask the Senate; to take the time to conside r it her\! today .
I have sought -- as I am sure other M<:mLers have - - I have sought to
follow as closdy as pos siblc the rapid !low of developments in that region as
th~y

are reported m the pr\lss.

Committee on Fo r o:Hgn
first-hand in Morocco.

~elations,

Suv~ral

mc.nths ago, as a m\!mbcr of the

I also found occasion to observe the situation

I regret that I was unablt.: to pr oceed at that time

beyond Morocco to Alge r ia and Tunisia as I desired to do.
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Limited as this background is, it is sufficient to convince me that
the pressures are growing for a more direct involvement of the United States
in the North African c risis.

It is sufficient to convince me that our policies

have drifted dangerously there, as they have elsewhere.

It is sufficient to

convince me that the time is already late for the Senate to focus attention on
North Africa.

If the available facts are inadequate for a complete understanding

of the situation and. in my opinion they are inadequate, I trust the Executive
Branch wtll take the troubh: to supplement them .

I hope lhat Members of this

body will see fit to acquaint themselves more fully with them by direct observation.

In a letter to the distinguished Chairman of the

Committe~

on Foreign

Relations, dated October 17, 1955, in which I t r ansmitted a report on Europe
after the Geneva Conference, I suggested that "in view of the possible repercussions on our policies respecting Europe and the Middle East , it might be
desirable for the committee to have some members familiarize themselves at
firsthand with the North African situation.'' I r eiterate that suggestion today.
In the meantime we can begin to exam ine the situation on the basis
of the limited info rmation that is already available.

Let me, at the outset,

point out that it is inexact to r egard all of North Africa as a single cnsis except
in the broadest sense .

The situations in Tunisia, Morocco and Alg eria have

many characteristics in common and present many similar problems.
however, also impo rtant diffe renc es .

There are

If our policies respecting North Africa

are to be effecttve, these differences must be given full consideration.

- 8 In the discussion today I should

lik~

to turn first to the similarities

of the situation in all three regions of North Africa.
Morocco and

Alg~ria

Taki!n tog\;thcr, Tunisia,

constitute a great crossroads, five hmes the size of

Metropolitan France, lying between the heart of the African continent. the
Middle East and Europe .

Over these

cro~sroads,

one direction or another since time immemorial.
ments have pas sed through them .

conquerors have moved in
The great religious move-

North Afr ica can be, as it has been, a

bridge to link three continents in peace, cooperation and progress.

It can also

be, as it has been, an avenue o! conquest which, if history is any indicator,
leads only to the ruin of both conqueror and conquered.
In recent times, Europeans, and particularly the French, have gone to
North Africa in great numbers.

They brought many of the benefits of material

progress as welt as political stabllity to the area and they took much from it.
The colons, as those who arc settled in the region

ar~..:

called, have a great

stake in all three regions and especially in Algeria whc;rc they number a million.
Their slake, however, is in many ways a privileged one, supported by the power
and sacrifict.;• of Metropolitan France .

The colons seuk to maintain that stake.

Many arc d\!tcrmined to maintain it by any means, including the ter r orization
of the Moslem populations and even the intimidation of the Frt.:nch Government
itself.
The great preponderance of the inhabitants of North Afrtca, however,
are not French or European.

They are mostly Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian
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Moslcrns.

And th-.! Moslems oi North Africa -- to id··ntify the p ople of the

three areal'! -- have been caught up in the same wave of militant nationalism
and pan-Islamism which has swept through most of the countries of the
East tn the decade since Vorld War II.

~1i~i<1t~

These movement5 among the Mosl.:!rns

nf North Africa ari!, I bclt...:v-a, for the most part authentic exp ressions of a
widespread popular discontent with a status of political inequality and social
and economic

mis~ry .

They contain their share of extremists who, like their

counterparts among the colons, arC; prepared to resort to the terrorizing of
peaceful Europeans and even other Mcslems in their determination to achieve
immediate political domination in the North African regions.
UnLil recently, thl.! situatLOn in Nor1h Africa has be'-n relatively
of Communist influence .

fre~

That docs not mean that it will long remain so .

On

the contrary, it is cl..,ar in Communist bro:1dcasts from Europe, from the
activities of agents in Not·th Africa, and from

th~

diplomacy of tht. Soviet Union

in the Middle East -- it is clear that lhc Communists arc seeking by any means
to make inroads into th\.'! Moslem nationalist movements .
And I believe wo.; may expect them to make those inroads unless the
causes of North African discontent arc

allcviat~d

in time, unless progress is

made in restoring a polttical stability to that area which is acceptable to the
great majority of the

nativ~ p~oplcs.

I! Communist influ .... nc~ grows, where will the responsibility lie? Vlith
th~

North Africanc who are st:eking r edress of legitimate political and economic

grievances?

We can hardly blame a drowning man for grasping at the tail of a
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shark if, in his agony, hl: misLakes it for a log .
on the diabolic genius of th(. Communists?
and they will offer North Africa as one

Can we plac ... the rcsponsibthtv

They will be only too glad to

mor~

evidence of

th~

tak~

it

invincible marcn

of communism towards world domination.
H communio m tnk ... s root in North Africa, I think the responsibility
w1ll not be attributable to the invincibility of that ideology or any exceptional
ability on the part of its adherents.
pcopl~

who

who

s~ck

pret~nd

Nor wtll it be attributable to the native

to rectify long - f..:stcring wrongs.

to excrcis.; political

r ~sponsib"lity

It will lie instead with those

in North Africa -- be they French,

Spauish or Moslem -- but who fail to exercise it with understanding, with compassion and with cou rage .
Africa, France and

It will lie with thost! European

cls~wherc

fanatic:~

in North

·whose only answer to the restlessness of a whole

people is a sterile anJ, in the l0ng run, futile rcprcs&ion.

It will lie with those

religious and pclitical extremists m the Moslem camps of North Africa and
nearby countries whoa-.: personal will to power is so overwhelming lhat in the
name of freedom they adopt irreconcilable positions which can destroy the m-:aning of freedom fo r thdr own people and undermine it cls•:!whcrc in the
Mediterranean regions.

1 do not undcrest\mate the
The bitterncsses are i.ntt!ns.a.

of r econciliation in North Africa.

The dilemmas arc many.

of power for a few arc so high that
than what appears to be their

di!ficulti~s

th~y

imm~.::diate

The stakes in terms

are blind to all considerations other
self-interest.
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13dor~

thu chance to obtain a just and reasonable settlement is lost,

however, I hope that those who gibe at the tdea will consider the consequences
which wilt flow from the failure to achieve one.
SomG of these consequences arc already
in tht! ugly face of racial ancl religious terrorism.

appar~nt.

The)' can be seen

That face has

in many parts of North Afr1ca during th{; past few years -- in tl.e

t~hown

itself

massacr~

of

thu innocunt, native and French alike, in the swift and deadly swt:!ep of the
knife of the political assassin, in the sabntagl;! of properties

repres~nting

decades of patient creative labor by both Europeans and Moslems.
Much innoc ... nt blood on both sid<..s has already been shed in North
Africa.

Much wanton

d~struction

has already been done.

But more blood will

flow and mo rc damage will be done unlcs s a settlement is achieved.
spoils will remain to the side which may emerge vic:torious 1f
continues?

They will inherit an accumulation of ruins.

th~

What

conflict

'fhty will gain a

heritage of smoldering hatred and fear, a sullen acquiesencc on the part of the
defl.!at~d.

And if that is the mexorable consuqucncc of an

11

all o r nothing" attitude

1n North Africa, what of its 1mpact on France?
Franc~

1s already bleeding itself white to maintain a force of over

300, 000 men in North Africa.

What have these sacrifices produced other than

the scorn and derision of thos..: who, forgetting the real greatness of France in
Europe, still dream Louts Napoleon's nineteenth century dream of grand empire
in th~ deserts and swamps of the tropics?

What have these sacrifices produced

- lZ but the dtsmay of the d\!c ... nt p'-ople of France and th" vutual immobtliz.ation of
their government?
Paris.

Now it has even come to mobs and ri o ts tn the streets of

What wtll follow?

tyranny?

The barncades and th .. n, after, th .. iron fist o f

How much longer will the frc ... institut10ns of Franco withstand thes

prcssur..:s ?

How mul:h lonr,cr befor\.: Western Europ ea n cohesion --d eprived

of the cssuntlal cement of
b~::gins

Fr~nch

inspirallOn -- how much

long~r

before it

to crumble?
And what of the Moslem

the: agonies of France?
and cl\' ilization?
fr~edom

p~::oplc

in Norlh Africa?

Will they gain from

Have they forgott\!n th e achievements of

Fr~nch

culture

Have they forgctten, in truth, th:ll the very demands for

and equality which they now echo throughout the land are themselves

de rived fro m th\.! traditions of liberty which flow from France?
1hcs c ar ...

~urnt!

of the questions which I hope

tho~c

"ho call for

11

all

or nothing•• in North Africa -- European and Moslem :\like -- will consider
carefully before it is too late.
There can be a peaceful solution to this crisis.
solution, in my opinion , only if
r ecogmzcd .

th~

But

lher~

can be a

r e alities of the situation arc fully and frankly

Th<::rc can be a solution only i£ the

r~sponsiblc

polittcal leaders

-- French and Moslem -- have the courage and dctc rmination to act fi:-mty on
th~.:se

reatiti.:ls and if they have the sympath ... tic suppo rt of other nations whose

fundamental self-interest lies in the preservation of peace in North Africa and
the Mediterranean r egion .
nations and th..:

n~arby

I mean this country as well as the Wcsterr. European

Arab states.

If

ther~.:

is more stirring of tho.: troubled
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waters, if there i6 a stubborn resistance to necessary change and if there is
malicious fishing for advantage by outsiders there shall be no solution in North
Africa and all will stand to lose in the long run regardless of any momentary
profit that may be gained.

If there is to be a stable and meaningful peace in North Africa, I
believe these principles must govern it :
1.

The legitimate

gri~vanccs

of the Moslem people must be corrected;

the economic, political and social inequities must be ended as rapidly as possible .
2.

The rights of thv European setlle1·s to a place in thu future of North

Africa must be protecte d.
3.

Responsible officials in North Africa must be prepared to deal

swiftly and impartially with the terrorism of the mob and the assassin, be they
European or Moslem.
I realize, Mr. President, that it is easy to state principles involving
other peoples several thousand

miles away . 1 realize, too, that if the crisis

is met successfully in North Africa, i.t will be met primarily as a result of the
efforts of the French and the Moslems .

My purpose in stating these principles

is not to prcsume to guide them -- the responsible leaders on both sides have
long since recognized them.

My purpose in emphasizing these principles is to

make clear what I believe to be the only valid framework in which American
foreign policy can exercise a constructive influence towards peace in North
Africa .
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Our direct

int~:rests

in North Africa arc r elahvely hmited and there

is little d\}sirc o r hkelihood cf any increase in the ncar future.
restde in the area.
Tangier and

Our coml'l"ercial intcrO?sts arc small.

~.;xtrate:rrilorial

o£ snrrl.lndcring.

w~ lh.\'C

Few Americans

We have rights in

privileges in Morocco which we are in the proces s

air bases in Morocco, built at creal cost, not !or us

alone, but as part of the defense structure of the North Atlantic community and
th..:

Mcditen·an~.;an

area.

If our dir<.!Ct

int~rcsts

are limited, however, our indirect interests --

as I have already tned to point out - -

ar~:

immense .

They add up to the urgent

n\.!CCSSlty of finding a peaceful solution of the North African cnsis .

Our interests

will be served by a foreign policy which contributes to that end, to the devdopmcnt of an accommodation that is acceptable tc thl.! vast majority of Moslems in
North Afl'ica and to France.

We cannot be a party to any plan to rcpr\!ss the

legitimate as paations of the Moslem peoples in No1·th Africa but at the same
lime

wt!

cannot abandon a frt:..; France in its hour of great need.

necos sarily, mutually exclusive objt:ctivcs.

They m

~.:d

These are not,

not immobilize our

fo'!'cign policy in that region .
Th~

way for us, then, is clear.

If France and tho.: North Africans

move t owards a reconciliation of their mt<!rests -- if the concept of

11

independencc

with interdependence" takes root --there may be a constructive role which,
together with other free nations, we can play; but on ly in those circumstances.
In some respects, there is hope for a 8\)ttlcm\!nt along those lines.
Tunisia important political agrcemento have atready been achi .. vcd.

In

Something
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similar is taking place with respecc to Morocco, despite the reticence of Spain
·which controls a substantial part of the Sultanate .
bt.:lievc a sound basis for further progress

ha~

In both these regions, I

been laid.

Alg\!ria, h owcv<:r, which is of the greatest importance to France,
presents far more difitcult and complex problems.

Algeria has long been

treated as an integral part of Metropolitan France, as "France south of
Mediterranean."

th~

France seeks a solution respl:cting Algeria in the alleviation

of the political inequities and the crushing burden of poverty under ·.vhich most
/dgerians liv\!, but without changing the present
France.

No one can say with any

cfiectivc.

c~rtainty

int~gration

of Algeria and

whether this approach will be

While it is being attempted, moreover, there is little that thts

country or any other country can do without complicating the difficulty.
Mr.

Pr~sid~.;nt,

we hav"- had expressions of despair in this r.ountry

over thc North African crisis interspcrs\!d with Lhe smiling assurances that
condit1ons were improving in the world.
the significanc..: of this situation lo us.

What

W\! hav~.;

not had is a facing up of

What w ... have not had is the kind of

intelligent initiative in our policies which might contribute to a

p~aceful

solution in North Africa.
At the outset I made ch;ar to the Senate my personal limitat1ons
in reviewing this situation.

As I pointed out, we may not have all the (acts .

But o n the basis of what we do know, on the basis of the facts which I have
attempted to summarize here today,

I am not satisfied that we have: done what
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might be done to increas\! the prospects for
me that

th~

p\!aC~

in North Africa.

It seems to

logic of tltese facts opens up avenues of explvration in foreign poltcy

whtch the Executive Branch might weil pursue and yet has not pursued, at least
to th"" knowledge of the

Scnat~.

As I noted, Ttlnisia and Morocco aru both moving to'-"ards !re.!dom with
interdependence on the hasis of agrc"'ments acceptable to
North African nationalist leaders .

The

t1m~

re~ponsible

Ft·ench and

may be fast approachtng when con-

sidl:ration should be given lo inviting both Tunisia and Morocco -- and Spam - to associate with NATO.
peacl. in the

Tllc-y ar"' e:3 Fcntial components in

Medilerran~nn

~he

maintenanc..: of

and I belicv.:! that NATO has much to offer for their

security .
It seems to me too that NATO, or perhaps the Western European Union,

could play a significant rclc in easing the economic str ... s sc..:s that the present
transition in North Africa places on both European and Moslem.

ls it too much

to anticipate thnl a joint economic effort by tht. NATO countries could contribute
imm~asurably

to the common progress of both?

Is it too much to anticipate that

such an effort might do much to alleviate the economic causes of discontent and
f"'ar m North Africa, that it might help to develop a mutuality of interest wh1ch
cculd translate the concept of "independence with interdependence" into a reality . .
Is it too much to cxpl.!ct the Executive Branch to exercise some initiative m lhis
direction?
Mr.
tion .

Presid~;nL,

I do not know whether these thoughts may have applica -

I do know, however, that a critical situation exists in North Africa which
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contatns dangerous implications for the United States.

It seems to me that in

such circumstancl.!s, th\!re is a responstbilily to do more than alternately exude
confidcmcc or despair .

There

lS

a responsibility on us to raise the 1ssues that

are involved and to consider possible ways in which they may be reso l ved .
is alt, Mr. President, that I have been trying to do today.

***************
*********

Tha t

